Poland and the Silesians : Minority rights à la carte? by Kamusella, Tomasz Dominik
42 
 
Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe  
Vol 11, No 2, 2012, 42-74 
 
Copyright © ECMI 21 December 2012 











University of St Andrews, Scotland 
 
The Silesians are an ethnic or national group that coalesced in the nineteenth century. 
During the subsequent century, they survived repeated divisions of their historical 
region of Upper Silesia among the nation-states of Czechoslovakia (or today its 
western half, that is, the Czech Republic), Germany, and Poland, which entailed 
Czechization, Germanization, and Polonization, respectively. The ideal of 
ethnolinguistic homogeneity, a typical goal of Central European nationalism, was 
achieved in post-war Poland. After the end of communism (1989) and the country‟s 
accession to the European Union (2004), this ideal is still aspired to, though it appears 
to stand in direct conflict with the values of democracy and rule of law. The Silesians 
are the largest minority in today‟s Poland and Silesian speakers are the second largest 
speech community in this country after Polish-speakers. Despite the Silesians‟ wish to 
be recognized as a minority, expressed clearly in their grassroots initiatives and in the 
Polish censuses of 2002 and 2011, Poland neither recognizes them nor their language. 
This inflexible attitude may amount to a breach of the spirit (if not the letter) of the 
Council of Europe‟s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 
and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, both of which Poland 
signed and ratified. The case of the Silesians is a litmus test of the quality of Polish 
democracy. In order to resolve the debacle, the article proposes a genuine dialogue 
between representatives of Silesian organizations and the Polish administration under 
the guidance of observers and facilitators from the Council of Europe and appropriate 
international non-governmental organizations. 
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The article presents the little known issue of present-day Poland‟s largest minority 
(817,000), the Silesians, who remain unrecognized in their home country to this day, 
and their language (spoken by 509,000 persons), which suffers the same fate of non-
recognition‟. The goal is to draw the attention of the international community of 
researchers and human rights observers to the subject, so that more studies and polls 
could be devoted to the Silesians. At present, due to the lack of such studies,
2
 there is 
a profound lack of clarity regarding how the Silesians emerged as a group, what they 
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may think of their situation nowadays, and what change (if any) they may desire. 
Until very recently, the history and even the very agency of the Silesians were a priori 
subsumed either in the Czech, German or Polish national master narrative. Thus, in 
the article, I attempt to provide a tentative historical overview of the group‟s past 
before focusing on the efforts for regaining agency for and by the Silesians as a group 
in their own right. 
As a backdrop to the analysis, I first delve into the logic of the ideology of 
nationalism that determines the processes of nation-state building and maintenance in 
the modern world and age of globalization. Second, I focus on the nature and 
paradoxes of the exclusivist ethnolinguistic nature of the Polish nation-state founded 
in 1918. The upheavals of the Great War in 1918, World War II, and the 1989 fall of 
communism deliver three periods in the history of this national polity that are 
radically different in ideology and forms of governance. Interwar Poland moved 
gradually from nascent democracy to authoritarianism. Communist Poland stuck to 
the economic and political orthodoxies associated with the Soviet-style 
totalitarianism. Post-communist, democratic and liberal Poland, which subscribed to 
free market economy, was deemed trustworthy enough to join the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1999 and the European Union (EU) in 2004. 
Nonetheless, all three Polands, which are seemingly so different from one 
another, share the same approach to the minorities residing in the state. From 1918 to 
2000 the share of the minorities in the state‟s population plummeted sharply from 
around 33% to 1%. In interwar Poland, although obliged by international treaties to 
grant recognition and rights to its minorities, the educational systems and 
organizations of the minorities were Polonized by official fiat (Horak, 1961). 
Following the genocide of Jews and Roma and the waves of wartime and post-war 
expulsions, the existence of the largely depleted minorities in communist Poland was 
denied as a matter of course. Post-communist Poland‟s wish to join NATO and the 
EU was made conditional on, inter alia, Warsaw‟s recognition of the minorities living 
in the country. Poland observes the letter of its international and constitutional 
obligations in this respect, but tries hard to avoid their spirit. The undeclared (and 
maybe even unrealized because it was so deeply entrenched in people‟s minds by 
school and official rhetoric during the last century) but foremost reaction and 
continuing goal of Polish politics and administration are to deepen the ethnolinguistic 
homogeneity of the Polish nation-state, irrespective of the official espousal of 
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multilingualism and multiculturalism in line with the guiding principles of European 
integration. For instance, Poland‟s current minority educational system is quite a 
faithful copy of that from the second half of the 1930s, when minority schools were 
referred to as “minority” for teaching the minority language as a subject for two to 
three hours per week; the rest of education was channelled through the medium of 
Polish (c.f. Kamusella, 2007b and 2008). 
Against this broader historical and theoretical backdrop, the history and 
specificity of the Silesians as an ethnic or national group until 1989 are presented. 
This presentation is preceded by a brief reflection on the nation-building (mis)uses of 
statistics and censuses in Central Europe since the last third of the nineteenth century. 
The accidental or intentional inclusion of one group and omission of another from a 
state‟s official statistical data granted, by default, the former group recognition 
(regardless of the state administrations unwillingness) and the right to exist as a 
subject of politics, while condemning the latter group to non-existence, which ideally 
(from the ennationalizing
3
 state‟s perspective) should lead to its swift assimilation and 
eventual disappearance. 
The last part of the article focuses on the political re-emergence of the 
Silesians in post-communist Poland thanks to entirely grassroots efforts within the 
unprecedented space of freedom granted to Polish citizens through the functioning 
democracy in the country. Unfortunately, during the last two decades when these 
processes have unfolded, the state administration has utilized every legal loophole 
available to not grant formal recognition to the Silesians as an ethnic, let alone 
national, minority or to the Silesian language. Paradoxically, at international forums, 
as a state party to the Council of Europe‟s Framework Convention for the Protection 
of National Minorities (FCNM) and to the European Charter for Minority or Regional 
Languages (ECMRL), Poland is eager to demonstrate its good will by showing that it 
fully observes and implements all the minority and linguistic rights protection 
measures stipulated in the two documents. 
However, this observance is to the persistent exclusion of Poland‟s 
numerically largest minority, the Silesians. The convention and the charter allow their 
state parties to choose which minorities and languages to protect and to what extent. 
This possibility lets states adopt an à la carte approach to their international 
obligations in the sphere of minority rights protection. The most notorious example in 
this respect among the EU‟s old member states is offered by France (Żelazny, 2000). 
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Poland, as many other ethnolinguistic nation-states in Central Europe, has emulated 
France in its ideological claims to a unitary and homogenous character, complete with 
the declaration of territorial integrity of the state as the highest good (c.f. The 
Constitution, 1997: articles 3, 5). By merely paying lip service to the observance of 
minority rights protection, the non-recognition of the Silesians permits Warsaw to 
reduce the number of members of Poland‟s minorities by almost two thirds, from 
1.388 million to 579,000, as the results of the 2011 census indicate. This translates 
into the decrease in the minorities‟ share in Poland‟s population from 3.6% to 1.5%. 
Thus, in view of the official reinterpretation (manipulation?) of statistics, the country 
is ethnolinguistically homogenous (Wyniki, 2012: 17-18). 
The article is wrapped up with the presentation of the latest developments, 
focusing on Silesian organizations‟ endeavours to have Silesian recognized as a 
regional language by the state. The organizations have limited themselves to this 
single modest goal because the events of the last 20 years show clearly that, 
irrespective of its constitutional and international obligations, Warsaw would not – if 
it can help it – agree to any recognition of the Silesians as an ethnic or national 
minority. Despite this inflexible stance of the Polish government and political elite, I 
present a set of recommendations for a dialogue between representatives of the 
Silesians and of the state administration, as repeatedly–thus far in vain–recommended 
by the Council of Europe‟s Advisory Committee on the FCNM (Advisory Committee, 
2003: 9-10; Advisory Committee, 2009: 9-11). 
 
1. The globalizing logic of nationalism 
The Silesians, like any other ethnic group, are a product of social and political forces 
that unfolded at a particular time in a particular place in the past. Human groups are 
fluid, though from the temporal perspective of an individual‟s lifetime they appear 
solid enough. Usually groups that are dubbed as “ethnic” persist at least for several 
generations. This feeds the popular perception that such groups are “forever”. During 
the last two centuries, or in other words, during the age of nationalism, this novel 
ideology has reified those human groups that have been accorded the novel rank of 
“nation” as the sole type of human groups that are to enjoy the unquestioned right of 
being the primary social unit of politics. This unit, in turn, has the right to a territory, 
construed as the nation‟s polity or nation-state (in other words, a political unit). As a 
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political principle, the reification of the nation proposes it as the sole source of 
sovereignty and the only legitimate social unit that has the right to unrestricted 
sovereignty on the territory of its nation-state (Gellner, 1983: 1). At the level of 
popular belief, especially in Europe, most members of a nation are prone to believe 
that theirs is very ancient  at least in excess of a millennium old  and that the nation 
is potentially immortal. 
Nationalism seriously restricted the number of human groups with a legitimate 
stake in politics, in practice equating it with the number of the extant polities, 
nowadays invariably defined as nation-states (with the singular exception of the Holy 
See). It does not mean that the process has eliminated other human groups of the 
ethnic sort. They are still around, continuously coming into being and disappearing 
(c.f. Magocsi, 1999). The ideology of nationalism, however, has disenfranchised 
them, making any political claims on their behalf illegitimate by default. The reality 
being messy and not succumbing to neat political and legal categorizations, there is a 
grey zone between groups recognized as nations and other groups with no right to 
their own political life. Non-national groups become nations mainly through 
successful warfare (for instance, the Eritreans or the Croats), through peaceful 
separation (for instance, the Azeris or the Slovaks), or by attaining a degree of 
political autonomy within the boundaries of an extant polity (for instance, the 
Galicians in Spain or the Welsh in Britain). 
What happens with groups that are not successful in this way, or simply are 
not interested in the national manner of participating in politics? Most are content 
with things as they are as long as their members are not discriminated against for the 
fact of being members of such groups. In this world of nation-states, discrimination 
often evokes reactions that have to necessarily be couched in national terms. Should a 
group wish to be taken seriously in the sphere of politics, it has no choice but to adopt 
a national rhetoric. 
Upstarts on the national path are seen as usurpers by the already recognized 
nations with their own national polities. The latter often deny the aspirations of the 
former, and even deny their very existence. When the usual sleight of hand is not 
available for political or international reasons, new groups seeking a degree of 
political recognition in this age of nationalism are redefined from above as 
“nationalities”, “proto-nations”, “pseudo-nations”, “ethnic groups”, “national or 
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ethnic minorities”, “ethnographic, social or regional groups” (of the nations on the 
territory of whose polities they dwell) and so on (c.f. Bauer, 2000: 355-370; Zubov, 
2009: 780-787). 
Alternatively, nationally construed categories are imposed from above on 
some groups that are not interested in expressing their interests in a national manner. 
This is especially the case when their non-national existence can be transformed into 
political capital for another (dominant and state-supported) nation. A telling example 
of such a group is the Russophone population of the large industrial cities in eastern 
Ukraine. Thus far they have defined themselves as workers, espousing an assorted 
selection of Soviet ideals and symbols surviving from the period before 1991; the 
Soviet Union was the only major state legitimizing its existence on the basis of an 
ideology other than nationalism, namely communism. Today, Moscow considers the 
Russophone workers of eastern Ukraine a Russian minority oppressed by Kyiv‟s 
policy of Ukrainization. On the other hand, the Ukrainian government perceives them 
as Russified Ukrainians who should be returned to the Ukrainian nation through de-
Russification. Letting them remain as they currently are does not seem to be an 
option, unfortunately (Zimmer, 2006: 119-134). 
 
2. Poland as an Ennationalizing State 
Poland was founded as a nation-state in 1918 and, after some wavering, a popular and 
by now  widespread consensus emerged that the Polish nation consisted of Polish 
speakers, preferably Roman Catholic or of Roman Catholic origin (in the case of 
communist apparatchiks, mostly self-professed first-generation atheists). Protestant 
and even atheist Polish speakers were also accepted, though with some reluctance, 
into the fold of such a Polish nation. The faithful of the Greek Catholic or Orthodox 
Churches, in liturgy and literacy associated with the Cyrillic alphabet, were by default 
excluded from Polishness, and were gradually reassigned in the course of the 
twentieth century as Belarusians, Ukrainians, and Rusyns (also known as Lemkos, 
Boykos, and Hutsuls). Judaism excluded a person from the commonality of the Polish 
nation even more vehemently, notwithstanding the fact that a person of Jewish origin 
might have declared himself or herself as a Pole and spoken no other language but 
Polish.  
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Such liberal treatment is denied not only to Jews of Polish origin, but even to 
Polish-speaking Jews. Until the turn of the twenty-first century, Israel was the largest 
market for Polish-language books outside Poland, but Polish authorities do not record 
any Polish minority in Israel. At most they may remark on Polish-speaking Jews or 
„our Jews‟ in the country (c.f. Eisler, 2010; Walaszek, 2001). 
In this ennationalizing manner, from the ethnolinguistic and ethnoreligious 
perspective, a third of interwar Poland‟s population was “un-Polish” (niepolski). The 
majority of ideologues of the Polish nation-state founded after the Great War have 
claimed continuity with Poland-Lithuania (officially known as the Commonwealth of 
the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania). However, if one 
anachronistically projects the categories of ethnonational identification into this pre-
national past, fewer than a third of the inhabitants of Poland-Lithuania could be 
credibly described as “Polish”. Hence, today‟s Poland, created by vast border changes 
and ethnic cleansing associated with World War II, where about 99% of its population 
can be defined as Polish from the ethnolinguistic and ethnoreligious perspective, 
appears to be the least Polish of all the Polands known in the past (c.f. Adamczuk and 
Zdaniewicz, 1991: 38, 50, 53; Kuklo, 2009: 222). 
 
3. The Silesians: who are they? 
The Silesians live in the centre and the eastern half of the historical region of Upper 
Silesia, or in the area extending from Opole (Oppeln) to Katowice (Kattowitz), and 
from Olesno (Rosenberg) to Racibórz (Ratibor).
4
 The historical region of Silesia, 
today in the south-western corner of Poland, extends from the German-Polish border 
to the industrial city of Katowice in the east; its historical capital, Wrocław (Breslau), 
lies in the middle. Silesia briefly belonged to medieval Poland until the mid-
fourteenth century. Then it became an integral part of the lands of the Czech Crown 
within the frontiers of the Holy Roman Empire. In the early 1740s, Prussia seized 
almost all of Silesia from the Habsburgs; only the southernmost sliver of Upper 
Silesia remained within the Austrian lands. It was later known as the crown land of 
Austrian Silesia in Austria-Hungary. 
In the wake of the counter-reformation, its overwhelmingly Catholic character 
set Upper Silesia apart from the rest of Silesia. Another difference was that one half of 
Upper Silesia‟s inhabitants spoke Slavic dialects, while the other half spoke Germanic 
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ones, though many were bilingual in both. Even so, this did not count for much until 
the age of nationalism, when the Slavophone half, often bilingual in German, became 
the basis for the rise of the Silesian ethnic identity. Earlier, speaking the same dialect 
or language or even professing the same faith did not make nobles and serfs members 
of the same nation. Nations did not even exist then. The narrow stratum of several per 
cent of the population, organized as the estates (nobility, clergy and burghers), 
controlled politics while the rest, as serfs, toiled without payment in fields for the sake 
of “their betters”. 
 
3.1 Language and statistics: measuring or creating? 
Modernization, or socio-political change spurred on by the Napoleonic Wars and 
accelerated in the course of the nineteenth century by industrialization and 
urbanization, completely altered the old order. Ethnolinguistic nationalism became the 
gradually accepted norm in Central Europe with the founding of the German Empire 
as a German nation-state in 1871. One had to speak an appropriate language 
(professing a preferred religion was encouraged, too) to be a member of a nation, 
regardless of whether one was of peasant or of noble origin. The process was 
facilitated by the standardization of languages through the use of authoritative 
grammars and dictionaries. Knowledge of these standardized languages was imparted 
to the population at large through compulsory elementary schooling, by conscript 
armies, by the press, and by state offices. Dialects were redefined as belonging to one 
or another standard language, with these languages being construed on an ideological 
plane as “national languages”. 
Thus, the age of nationalism was also ushered into Upper Silesia and one 
could not speak only in order to communicate, as one did previously; now one first 
had to speak something reified as a language before any communication could take 
place (Billig, 1995: 29). Speaking what had been made into a language by the spread 
of mass literacy became the sign of belonging to one nation or another. In the first half 
of the nineteenth century, Prussian (later German) statisticians selected language as a 
presumably quantifiable indication of a person‟s nationality (the fact of belonging to a 
nation) and they convinced statisticians from other European countries to adopt this 
approach in 1872 at the Eighth International Congress of Statistics in St Petersburg. 
Subsequently, censuses across Europe began to inquire about what languages 
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individuals used in order to ascertain to what nations they might belong (Arel, 2002: 
94-96). 
 
3.2 Novel Identities 
With the privilege of hindsight, we could say that asking the language question in 
censuses did not really measure nations, but rather created them. In this way, 
“modern” demographic data were fashioned and fitted to various potential nations. 
Aspiring leaders of the respective national movements did not fail to use the officially 
approved numbers as political arguments to win political recognition and privileges 
for their nations (and themselves). Prior to this ennationalizing modernization, the 
inhabitants of Upper Silesia defined themselves in terms of their membership in 
estates, their religion and their locality of residence. Popular loyalty to the divinely 
appointed monarch unified subjects of variously organized identities into a coherent 
body politic. Now, statisticians redefined Germanicphone Upper Silesians as German-
speaking and their Slavophone counterparts as Polish- and Moravian-speaking. (They 
completely disregarded as ideologically inconvenient the phenomenon of bi- and 
multilingualism. Nationalism especially of an ethnolinguistic character  does not 
allow a person to belong to more than a single nation; the individual is discouraged 
from declaring more than one language as “truly” hers or his.) The statistics provided 
Polish national leaders from Posen (Poznań), Cracow, and Warsaw with an argument 
that because Upper Silesia was at least in part a Polish land, in the future it had to be 
incorporated into a Polish nation-state. Czech national activists chose to see the 
Moravian language as a sign of “Czechness”, thus claiming Upper Silesia for a future 
Czech nation-state. 
Polish and Czech politicians did not care that the majority of Upper Silesia‟s 
Slavophones at that time did not consider themselves to be Poles or Czechs. In their 
disregard for the opinions of the population concerned, they shared an attitude with 
their German counterparts. After the creation of the German Empire, the German 
authorities surprised many Upper Silesians by pressing them to espouse Protestantism 
and to speak in German only, and by telling them that it was no longer enough to be a 
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3.2 Ennationalizing Central Europe 
The turning point was the creation of ethnolinguistically defined nation-states in 
Central Europe in the wake of the First World War (c.f. Baár, 2010). Having co-opted 
various national movements for the war effort, the victorious Allies partitioned the 
non-national Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire, and also detached some 
territories from the German Empire and from the former Russian Empire that could be 
seen as ethnonationally non-German and non-Russian, respectively. 
Between 1920 and 1922, Upper Silesia was divided between Czechoslovakia, 
Germany and Poland. Austrian Silesia, which like Germany‟s Upper Silesia was 
populated by Germanicphone and Slavophone people, was partitioned between 
Prague and Warsaw. In their respective sections of the regions, the three nation-states 
began to ennationalize (often with the initial use of extreme violence) the inhabitants 
to their Czech(oslovak), German, or Polish nations (Wilson, 2010). Soon it became 
apparent that speaking one or another Slavic dialect, classified from above as Czech 
or Polish, did not necessarily make one into a “true” Czech or Pole. The acquisition of 
the standard language was required for this purpose. On the other hand, some harsh 
ennationalizing policies in Czechoslovakia and Poland convinced the majority of the 
Slavophones (who were bilingual in German) from both Upper and Austrian Silesia 
that they preferred to be Germans, rather than Czechs or Poles (c.f. Jerczyński, 2006: 
83-233). 
The post-1918 border and identification changes nudged into existence 
Silesian ethnic and ethnonational political parties. These parties wanted the 
transformation of Upper Silesia and Austrian Silesia either into independent Silesian 
nation-states or into autonomous regions, preferably within post-war Germany or 
Czechoslovakia. During the interwar period Silesian political groupings were 
suppressed in Poland. As a consequence, their former members often sided with the 
German minority in Poland‟s sections of Upper Silesia and Austrian Silesia. In 
Czechoslovakia‟s sections of both regions and in Germany‟s rump Upper Silesia, the 
Silesian identity was tolerated. In Czechoslovakia, this tolerance reduced the 
numerical status of the German and Polish minorities, whilst in Germany it made 
embracing Slavophones possible for culturally (not linguistically) defined 
Germandom, as eigensprachige Kulturdeutsche (“non-German-speaking Germans 
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united with the German nation through shared German culture”) (Eichenberger, 1994: 
36). 
Interestingly, on the basis of north Moravian and south Upper Silesian Slavic 
dialects, Óndra Łysohorsky (a pseudonym of Erwin Goj), a poet from interwar 
Czechoslovakia, created a distinct Lachian language. He proposed the idea of a 
Lachian nation, which gained some support during the war in the Soviet Union. 
However, Czechoslovak émigré politicians strongly opposed the movement and 
consigned Łysohorsky (who had to settle in Bratislava, far away from his Lachia) to 
virtual oblivion after 1945 (Hannan, 2005). 
 
3.4 World War II 
In the wartime years, all of Upper Silesia and almost all of Austrian Silesia were 
included in the Third Reich. The Slavophones and bilingual persons in Poland‟s parts 
of Prussian and Austrian Silesia and in Czechoslovakia‟s sections of the two regions 
were defined as an “in-between” (Zwischensicht in German) population.5 They were 
to be properly ennationalized into the German nation by teaching them fluent German 
and by banning the use of any Slavic language, whether it was the local dialect, or, 
worse, standard Czech or Polish. In German terminology they were briefly defined as 
“Silesians” (Oberschlesier in Upper Silesia and Slonzaken in Austrian Silesia6), but 
shortly afterwards they were made into full Germans by administrative fiat. The war 
effort took the upper hand over the plans for relocating the Silesians into Germany‟s 
heartland to ensure their proper Germanization. After a period of administrative 
vacillation, they were granted full German citizenship and were thus eligible to be 
drafted into the Wehrmacht (c.f. Kaczmarek, 2010). 
 
3.5 The communist years 
Slavophone and bilingual (that is, Slavic- and German(ic)-speaking) Silesians, who 
were claimed simultaneously as Germans and Poles in Upper Silesia and as Czechs in 
Austrian Silesia, became an ideological and statistical anomaly after the war. The 
Allies returned to Czechoslovakia and Poland their pre-war share of Upper Silesia and 
Austrian Silesia, and granted all of interwar Germany‟s section of Upper Silesia (as 
well as other German territories east of the Oder-Neisse line) to a radically changed 
Poland. The Allies also enabled the expulsion (“transfer”) of Germans from both these 
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states. Silesians were exempted from this expulsion, often against their own will and 
wishes, and were retained as officially dubbed “Autochthons” (or “ethnic Poles 
unaware of their Polishness”) in Poland and as ethnic Czechs and Poles in 
Czechoslovakia. West Germany, and then reunified Germany, has continued to claim 
them as Germans (Linek, 2000; Wanatowicz, 2004: 22-132). 
The retention of Silesians was an economic necessity for Warsaw and Prague. 
There was no comparable replacement source of qualified labour to run the Upper 
Silesian and Czech Silesian industrial basins. Neither the reconstruction of the states 
nor the development of heavy industry (required by the Soviet-style militarized 
modernization that was implemented) would have been possible without the industrial 
production of these areas. On the ideological plane, the existence of Silesians as 
“Autochthons” was considered proof of Warsaw‟s claim of the archaic Polish 
character of the German territories incorporated into post-war Poland. This 
legitimized Poland‟s new western border in the eyes of its inhabitants and (to a lesser 
degree) of the international public. In reality, however, Silesians were treated as 
“crypto-Germans”. Their permanent status as second-class citizens caused them to 
“vote with their feet”. Whenever possible, they left communist Poland and 
Czechoslovakia en masse for West Germany, where, as Aussiedlers or “ethnic 
German resettlers”, they were (re-)granted German citizenship (Jerczyński, 2006: 
233-251; Kamusella, 1999). 
 
4. Post-communist Poland and Silesians 
The contracting of the Border Treaty (1990) and the Treaty on Cooperation and Good 
Neighbourliness (1991) between Germany and Poland lessened the ideological 
importance of Silesians as a political argument. The replacement of a centrally-
planned economy with its free-market counterpart decoupled the economy from the 
industrial-military complex (such coupling had been typical of the Soviet bloc 
countries). Swift deindustrialization followed, during which numerous coal mines and 
metallurgical works closed down in Poland‟s Upper Silesia and in Czech Silesia. On 
top of that, the introduction of democracy allowed Silesians to make their voices 
heard, regardless of what Warsaw or Prague may have wished of them. 
In the context of democratization and rising unemployment, most Silesians 
from the (western and central) section of Upper Silesia that belonged to interwar 
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Germany applied for and were granted German citizenship, without the necessity of 
leaving Poland for Germany. (A similar process also unfolded across the border in the 
Czech Republic.) The institution of dual citizenship was not legal then (and still is 
not) in German or Polish law, but Germany and Poland silently tolerated the situation 
in Upper Silesia. On one hand, the former country faced huge problems with the 
integration of hundreds of thousands of Aussiedlers streaming in during the 1990s 
from the Soviet Union and the then former Soviet states. On the other hand, Warsaw 
did not want to lose as many as 200,000 people from western and central Upper 
Silesia (or the Opole Region). Such a loss would have led to the economic and social 
collapse of the area.
7
 Hence, the Polish authorities agreed to the emergence of a 
recognized German minority, mostly consisting of Silesians whom Warsaw had 
previously claimed to be Poles, or Autochthons (Berlińska, 1999: 176-335; 
Wanatowicz, 2004: 133-186). 
Beginning in 1993, German citizenship granted to Silesians residing in Poland 
came with the bonus of EU citizenship. This allowed them to work and reside legally 
in Germany and elsewhere in the EU before Poland became a member of the EU in 
2004. Germany and Austria, however, chose to maintain the maximum derogation 
period of seven years on the free movement of workers from, inter alia, Poland and 
the Czech Republic, thus closing their labour markets to Polish and Czech citizens 
until mid-2011. This contributed to the fortification of the German national identity 
among Silesians in the Opole Region, even though, because of forced Polonization 
during the communist period, the vast majority of them did not speak any German. 
Speaking the language is still seen as the main sign of one‟s Germanness, so Silesians 
often are considered to be “un-German” or even to be “Poles” when in Germany until 
they acquire a passing knowledge of German. 
Not surprisingly then, language(s) spoken by Silesians have been employed 
for identification and political purposes. The generations born before 1945 and those 
who came of age before the fall of communism in 1989 mostly speak the local Slavic 
dialect, dubbed as “our language” (pō naszymu in Silesian), or the (Upper) Silesian 
dialect (gwara in Polish) or language (gŏdka or szpracha in Silesian). Most have a 
limited command of standard Polish that was acquired in elementary school and 
gleaned from television. The older generation, who still attended German elementary 
school before 1945, knows German and may not know any standard Polish. Among 
Silesians with German citizenship in the Opole Region, the Slavic dialect (Silesian) 
Kamusella, Poland and the Silesians 
55 
 
often functions as the main sign of their Germanness vis-à-vis Poles. This occurs 
especially among those who do not know German because many Poles see the 
Silesian language as a dialect of German. The sociolinguistic situation tends to be 
different in the Katowice region, where speaking Silesian may be interpreted as the 
indication of one‟s Silesianness or Polishness. In practice, it depends on the individual 
and on the neighbourhood where she or he lives, whether the Silesian spoken by a 
person is taken to be a sign of their Silesianness or their Polishness (c.f. Badania, 
2010: 38-39; Kamusella, 2005-2006). 
 
4.1 The Silesians 
The situation of Silesians from the eastern third of Upper Silesia that belonged to 
interwar Poland, or from the Katowice region (that in 1999 was confusingly renamed 
the Silesian region), was significantly different from that of their counterparts in the 
Opole region. Due to the vagaries of (West) German citizenship law, most of them did 
not have the possibility to acquire German citizenship after 1989; at this time the rate 
of joblessness suffered by these Silesians was higher than it was for those in the Opole 
region. To add insult to injury, the needs and grievances of Silesians in the Katowice 
region were overlooked by mainstream Polish political parties. This bred resentment 
and created the social basis for the founding of the Ruch Autonomii Śląska (RAŚ, 
Silesian Autonomy Movement) in 1991. The party‟s aim is to transform all of Upper 
Silesia into an autonomous region of Poland, in emulation of the autonomy enjoyed 
by Poland‟s section of Upper Silesia in the interwar period (Sekuła, 2009). 
A similar program of autonomy for Moravia and Czech Silesia in the Czech 
Republic was adopted by Hnutí samosprávné Moravy a Slezska – Moravské národní 
sjednocení (The Movement of Autonomous Moravia and Silesia – Moravian National 
Union) in the early 1990s. The claim was fortified by the 1.36 million declarations of 
Moravian nationality and 44,000 of Silesian nationality in the 1991 Czechoslovak 
census. However, the party had lost most of its initial attraction and influence by the 
turn of the twenty-first century. In the 2001 census the number of declarations of the 
two nationalities dropped to 380,000 and 11,000, respectively (Mareš, 2002; Základní, 
2003). 
In Poland‟s Upper Silesia, in 1996, RAŚ was joined by a twin organization, 
Związek Ludności Narodowości Śląskiej (ZLNŚ, Union of the Population of the 
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Silesian Nationality), which followed an ethnocultural programme supporting the 
development of the Silesian language and appealing for the recognition of the 
Silesians as a nation or an ethnic group. The ZLNŚ grew out of RAŚ‟s frustration 
over being prevented from entering the Polish parliament by the 5% election 
threshold. In Poland, national minorities are exempted from meeting this threshold, 
hence ZLNŚ, as a potential representative of the Silesian national minority, could 
allow RAŚ and ZLNŚ activists to join mainstream Polish politics (Roczniok, 2012). 
The authorities in Warsaw did not consent and refused registration of the ZLNŚ. The 
ensuing legal battle continued all the way up to the European Court of Human Rights 
in Strasbourg. The court decided that Warsaw was not compelled to register the 
ZLNŚ, if registration was a ploy to circumvent the election threshold. Nonetheless, 
the court also recommended that the Polish authorities engage in a constructive 
dialogue with ZLNŚ. Such a dialogue is yet to take place8 (Jerczyński, 2006: 252-255; 
Lange, 2009: 22, 36; Roczniok, 2006). Similarly, Warsaw rejects any possibility of a 
dialogue on the recognition of Silesian as a language, despite the recommendation 
voiced by the Committee of Experts reporting on the implementation of the ECMRL 
in Poland (ECRML, 2011: 6-7, 107-108). 
 
4.2 The 2002 census 
In 2002, the first post-communist census took place in Poland. Strangely, questions 
about nationality and family language(s) of the respondents were included in the 
questionnaire. Such questions had never been asked in communist Poland, with the 
exception of the 1946 census in which a question solely about German nationality and 
language had been asked. The aim of this question in the 1946 census was to establish 
the number of Germans that still needed to be expelled from post-war Poland. 
Moreover, the Polish post-communist Constitution (1997) defines the Polish 
nation as all the citizens of the Republic of Poland, irrespective of their ethnically 
defined nationality, language or religion (The Constitution, 1997: preamble). The 
census and its questionnaire were prepared by the Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność 
(AWS, Solidarity Electoral Caucus) coalition government that was in office between 
1997 and 2001. A small but vocal member of the AWS coalition was the now 
insignificant Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko-Narodowy (ZChN, Christian-National 
Union). The ZChN reintroduced elements of an interwar ethnonational program into 
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the political mainstream in post-communist Poland. The suspicion (which in the 
future may or may not be confirmed when relevant archival documentation is made 
available to researchers) is that this party‟s leaders advocated the inclusion of the 
nationality and language questions in the questionnaire of the 2002 census. 
The ZChN‟s intention may have been to reconfirm the ethnolinguistic 
homogeneity of Poland achieved in the communist period. It may also have been 
intended to check whether the demographic size of the national minorities in Poland 
conformed to the claims of the minorities‟ leaders in this regard. 
In the 2002 census, over 96% of Poland‟s population declared Polish 
nationality; more than 2% refused to answer the question. This meant that slightly 
more than 1% declared a non-Polish nationality. This reaffirmed Poland‟s unusual 
ethnonational homogeneity. In addition, the numbers of declarations of German, 
Belarusian, Ukrainian, or Roma nationalities were well below the estimates of the 
minorities‟ leaders. 
The biggest surprise of the census was the number of the declarations of 
Silesian nationality (173,000), which made the Silesians the largest national minority 
in Poland. In official results Warsaw seems to have manipulated the outcome, first by 
obstructing the declarations of Silesian nationality, and then by unilaterally redefining 
the Silesian minority as a “social group” of the ethnolinguistically-defined Polish 
nation. (For these “irregularities” Poland was criticized by the United Nations, see 
Committee, 2003). This decision further lowered the share of non-Polish minorities in 
Poland‟s population to below 1% (Jerczyński, 2006: 255-256; Ludność, 2011; 
Największa, 2003; UN Committee, 2003: 2; Wróblewski, 2006). 
Prague did not resort to influencing the results of its 1991 or 2001 censuses, 
though the huge number of declarations of Moravian nationality could not have been 
to the political elite‟s liking. The Czech authorities accepted the existence of the 
Moravian and Silesian national/ethnic minorities in the Czech Republic by registering 
their parties and organizations. Thus far, however, except for the first half of the 
1990s, leaders of the minorities have failed to translate their recognition into a viable 
political presence in the Czech Republic. 
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4.3 The Silesians after the 2002 census 
The denial of the existence of the Silesians strengthened the resolve of their leaders to 
prove Warsaw wrong. Importantly, in the census, 57,000 people declared Silesian to 
be their home language. Not surprisingly, Warsaw did not espouse the result; the 
official results retroactively redefined the declarations of speaking the Silesian 
language as „declarations of speaking Silesian, a dialect of the Polish language‟ (c.f. 
ECRML, 2011: 107-108; Rząd, 2011; Semik, 2011). 
Beginning in 2007, popular disagreement with this negative approach of the 
Polish authorities toward Upper Silesia and the Silesians has been expressed in the 
annual March for Autonomy (Marsz Autonomii), which gathers several thousand 
participants every year in Katowice (Historia, 2012). Around that time, the Silesians 
also began more clearly manifesting their presence among other minorities living in 
Upper Silesia with  hundreds participating in the special annual holy mass celebrated 
in autumn at the most important pilgrimage site in Upper Silesia, the shrine of Góra 
św. Anny/Sankt Annaberg, also known as the “Holy Mount of the Silesians”.  The 
tradition of this mass goes back to 1997 and, in the recent years, some parts of the 
mass are spoken in the Silesian language (Członkowie, 2012). 
The debacle of the ZLNŚ case in the European Court of Human Rights and the 
falsification of the census results in relation to the Silesians and their language led to a 
change in the leadership of RAŚ and the ZLNŚ, as well as in the organizations‟ 
programmes. RAŚ temporarily distanced itself from the ethnonational and 
ethnolinguistic dimension of Silesianness. Its leaders focused on advocating for 
autonomy for Upper Silesia that would benefit all the region‟s inhabitants, 
irrespective of their nationality or language. The new approach, coupled with the 
mainstream Polish parties‟ continued disregard for the region‟s needs, led to the 
success of RAŚ in the 2010 local elections. The organization gained over 8% of the 
votes in the Katowice (Silesian) region (with a population of 4.64 million), entered the 
regional assembly (Sejmik), and joined the ruling coalition in the region (Jerzy, 2010; 
Obwieszczenie, 2010). 
The ZLNŚ, faced with Warsaw‟s staunch opposition to the recognition of the 
Silesians as a national minority, focused on the development of the Silesian language. 
The organization supported the founding of the Narodowa Oficyna Śląska (NOŚ, 
Silesian National Publishing House, also referred to as the Ślōnsko Nacyjno Ôficyno 
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in Silesian) in 2003. NOŚ publishes books on Silesian matters in Polish, German, and 
Silesian. In 2006, it began publishing the first-ever bilingual Silesian-Polish 
periodical. A year later, the ZLNŚ applied for and successfully secured the ISO 693-3 
code szl for Silesian, which amounts to the international recognition of Silesian as a 
language (Request, 2007). 
Meanwhile, a grassroots movement had developed to write, publish and 
broadcast in Silesian on the internet. The tangible result of the movement is the 
Silesian Wikipedia (that is, the most extensive book available in the Silesian 
language) that was initiated in 2006 and officially established in 2008 (Powstała, 
2011). In the same year, two organizations for the cultivation of the Silesian language 
were founded, namely, Pro Loquela Silesiana (in Latin, For the Sake of the Silesian 
Language) and the Tôwarzistwo Piastowaniô Ślónskij Môwy „Danga” (in Silesian, 
“Rainbow” Society for the Cultivation of the Silesian Language). 
To put the achievements in perspective, out of the world‟s estimated 7000 
extant languages (Statistical, 2012), only 500 to 600 are used regularly in writing and 
have written materials produced in them on paper and/or on the web (c.f. MARC, 
2007). However, viable literate communities coalesced around only 200 to 300 of the 
languages. For instance, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is available in 
388 languages (Universal, 2012), while Wikipedia is available in 285 languages. The 
Silesian Wikipedia with 2080 articles is small but respectable, scoring the 188
th
 place 
in the ranking (List of Wikipedias, 2012). 
Politicians in the Katowice (Silesian) region could not fail to notice the rise in 
support for the Silesian language. In order to capitalize on it, the Katowice (Silesian) 
Regional Assembly supported the organization of a conference in 2008 on the 
standardization of the Silesian language (Roczniok, 2009). Besides these groups 
mentioned above, linguists from the University of Silesia in Katowice joined the 
effort. As a result, in 2009 a standard orthography was adopted for writing Silesian, 
(Kanōna, 2009) and in 2010 two Silesian primers were published for elementary 
schools (Adamus et al., 2010; Roczniok and Grynicz, 2010). Around 15 Silesian-
language books in standard orthography had appeared by mid-2012, mostly published 
by NOŚ (c.f. List, 2012). 
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5. A possible rapprochement between Warsaw and the Silesians? 
Poland signed and ratified both the FCNM and the ECRML, which came into force in 
the country in 2001 and 2009, respectively. Norm adoption was completed, in line 
with the political criterion of the 1993 Copenhagen criteria (c.f. Accession Criteria, 
2012), which set out the conditions that candidate states had to meet before becoming 
eligible for EU membership. However, the norms have an arbitrary loophole to allow 
states to decide which minorities and which minority or regional languages to protect, 
even if this does not take account of realities on the ground. The condoning of an à la 
carte approach to the FCNM and to the ECRML, allowing states to choose which 
minorities and languages are to be protected, gives rise to paradoxes. 
Poland‟s 2005 Act on National and Ethnic Minorities and on the Regional 
Language aspires to protect Karaims (45 persons, according to the 2002 census), as 
well as Tatar and Armenian languages, which are (wrongly) believed to be traditional 
languages of Poland‟s Tatars and Armenians. The Tatars lost their ethnic Tatar 
language already in the fourteenth century, while the Armenians never spoke 
Armenian in Poland, but rather spoke the Turkic language of Kipchak
9
 (Ustawa, 
2005; Wicherkiewicz, 2010). In addition, the employment of the singular form of the 
noun “language” in the Act has a specific ramification. Poland recognizes and protects 
only a single regional language, namely, Kashubian. Outside Poland this Slavic 
language had been recognized since the early twentieth century, but in Poland the 
dogma had prevailed that it was a dialect of Polish until Warsaw officially recognized 
Kashubian as a language in its own right in the aforementioned 2005 Act. 
Why such a change of heart? In the 2002 census 5,000 persons declared their 
nationality to be Kashubian, but 53,000 declared Kashubian as their home language. 
Hence, most of the Kashubs consider themselves to be Poles who happen to speak 
Kashubian. Kashubs then differ from Silesians who instead declare that they are un-
Polish, that is, of Silesian nationality and speak Silesian (or merely happen to speak 
Polish or German, which has no bearing on their Silesian identity). Thus, it was 
possible to define the Kashubs as a regional group of the Polish nation without 
stretching the reality on the ground too much. Most consented, and in return Warsaw 
recognized Kashubian as a regional language (c.f. Obracht-Prondzyński and 
Wicherkiewicz, 2011). The developments may have been helped by Donald Tusk, a 
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Kashub himself, who was deputy speaker of the Polish Sejm (lower chamber) between 
2001 and 2005, and who became Polish Prime Minister in 2007 (Tylko u nas, 2011). 
 
5.1 A new opening for the Silesian language? 
Although the leadership of the ZLNŚ persist in their efforts to register their 
organization, they have ceased to insist on defining the Silesians as a national 
minority. These tactics had proved futile in the face of Warsaw‟s staunch opposition. 
The Polish political elite, in breach of the Constitution‟s civic definition of the Polish 
nation, insist on the maintenance and continuous fortification of the ethnolinguistic 
and ethnonational homogeneity of Poland. This ethnicizing dimension of Polish 
nationalism was reintroduced into Polish politics in the wake of the 2005 
parliamentary elections. In a move unprecedented since 1945, the Liga Polskich 
Rodzin (LPR, League of Polish Families), founded in 2001, adopted an openly 
ethnonational and xenophobic program and gained 8% of votes in the parliamentary 
elections in 2005. Other parties, having observed the electoral efficacy of such a 
program, also began espousing its elements, most notably the Prawo i Sprawiedliwość 
party (PiS, Law and Justice), which won the parliamentary elections in 2005. PiS 
formed a coalition government with the LPR and a populist party (Wybory, 2012). 
A growing reaction against such an ethnonational program combined with 
religiously-based Catholic conservatism wiped out the LPR from the political scene in 
the 2007 parliamentary elections and forced PiS into opposition. Even so, a degree of 
acceptance of the ethnonational program (unthinkable before 2001) has remained. 
This does not bode too well for the ZLNŚ‟s efforts to find a new opening with 
the Polish authorities. The legal definitions of national and ethnic minorities given in 
the 2005 Act make it impossible for any stateless group to claim the status of nation 
or national minority in Poland. The ZLNŚ does not intend to argue against it and 
would like Warsaw to recognize the Silesians as an ethnic minority. The ZLNŚ 
realizes that the Polish political elite most probably will not concede this, either. Thus, 
in practice, since 2005 the organization has concentrated on the issue of the Silesian 
language, seeking the status of regional language for it, in emulation of the Kashubian 
example. 
In 2007, a group of members of parliament from the Katowice (Silesian) 
region submitted a parliamentary bill to this effect, but the parliament rejected it. 
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Another bill that intended to add Silesian as another regional language to the 2005 Act 
on the National and Ethnic Minorities and on Regional Language was submitted in 
late 2010. In 2011 Parliament decided to not consider it (Projekt, 2010; W Sejmie, 
2011). 
 
5.2 The Polish census of 2011 
Many believed that the results of the 2011 census would be the tipping point, either 
confirming the will of the Silesians to be recognized as a minority, complete with its 
Silesian language, or proving that the results of the 2002 census were a transitory 
fluke in regards to the declarations of Silesian nationality and language. In 2011, in 
anticipation of the former scenario, a group of RAŚ activists in the Opole region 
applied for the registration of a new organization, Stowarzyszenie Osób Narodowości 
Śląskiej (SONŚ, Association of People of the Silesian Nationality). To everybody‟s 
surprise, the law court in Opole registered this organization, despite the inclusion in 
its name of the collocation “Silesian nationality” (narodowość śląska), which in 
Polish can be variously interpreted as a “Silesian national group” or “Silesian national 
minority”. This very collocation has prevented the registration of the ZLNŚ since 
1997. However, the founders of SONŚ, taking into account the decision of the 
European Court of Human Rights on ZLNŚ, clearly stated in the organization‟s statute 
that SONŚ would not take part in parliamentary elections in which recognized 
minorities are exempted from meeting the 5% threshold (Pszon, 2012; SONŚ statute, 
2011). Nonetheless, in 2012 the Office of State Prosecutor in Opole appealed the 
legality of the registration of SONŚ, quite paradoxically arguing that the Silesian 
nationality or nation and the Silesian language do not and cannot exist in Poland‟s 
“legal reality” (obowiązujący system prawa), because they are not enumerated in the 
2005 Act on National and Ethnic Minorities and on the Regional Language 
(Ostrowski, 2012: 1). 
Obviously, the principle that any legal system should reflect and serve the 
needs of the social reality on the ground is not addressed. This justifies proposing that 
the state administration abuses the rule of law in order to deny the existence of the 
Silesians and their language by administrative fiat. The main accusation levelled 
earlier against the ZLNŚ and now against SONŚ is that the organizations‟ aims are to 
separate Upper Silesia from Poland, as a step to founding an independent Upper 
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Silesian nation-state. However, not a shred of such an intention may be detected from 
organizations‟ statutes, programs, or publications. 
On the other hand, neither the state administration nor a representative of the 
Polish juridical system voiced any opposition to the 2007 registration of the Śląski 
Ruch Separatystyczny (ŚRS, Silesian Separatist Movement), though it has the goal of 
separating Upper Silesia from Poland included both in its name and statute. Very few 
joined the ŚRS, and its subsequent inactivity led to its de facto demise. At present, the 
ŚRS is in liquidation, but its already half-a-decade-long existence speaks volumes on 
the state‟s double standards when dealing with Silesian issues10 (Śląski Ruch, 2012). 
 The confirmed results of the 2011 census, announced in July 2012, took civil 
servants and politicians by surprise: 817,000 (2.1%) people declared that they belong 
to the Silesian nation,
11
 and 509,000 (1.3%) declared that they speak Silesian at home 
and with neighbours and friends. The number of people that declared their belonging 
to a nationality other than Polish or speaking of a language other than Polish amount 
to 1,404,000 (3.6%) and 729,000 (1.9%), respectively. The Silesians account for 58% 
of the former group and Silesian-speakers for 70% of the latter (Raport, 2012: 106, 
108). 
Thus, Silesians, constituting well over half of the members of Poland‟s 
minorities and two thirds of the speakers of languages other than Polish in the 
country, are the dominant national and linguistic minority in today‟s Poland. The 
results pose Warsaw with a serious dilemma about what to do. Should the trick of the 
previous census be repeated, when the Silesians and Silesian-speakers were excluded 
from the numbers, then the demographic size of persons of non-Polish nationalities 
would shrink substantially to 587,000 (1.5%), and that of speaking languages other 
than Polish to 220,000 (0.6%). This would constitute even a bigger statistical 
manipulation than that of a decade ago. Does the democratic and successful Poland of 
today really need to risk breaching the rule of law and its international obligations for 
the sake of the elusive quest for absolute ethnolinguistic “purity”? 
From the global vantage point, Poland is unusual in its extraordinary 
homogeneity, which at 3.6% (or 1.5% with the Silesians excluded) is nearly in the 
range of statistical error, almost on a par with the total number of persons (951,000 or 
2.5%) whose nationality was not established in the census (Raport, 2012: 106). The 
state administration‟s perceivable drive at pushing the share of minorities in Poland‟s 
population below the threshold of 1% seems to be a throwback from the communist 
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past, when Warsaw customarily claimed that virtually no minorities lived in the 
country, despite hundreds of thousands Germans and Silesians leaving (with official 
approval or not) for West Germany in the 1970s and 1980s. 
This tendency is in direct contradiction with the EU‟s foundational four 
freedoms: free movement of people, services, goods, and capital. The freedoms 
underpinned by the Schengen Agreement allow for EU citizens to search for jobs and 
settle wherever they may want in the EU. As a result, after the 2004 accession of 
Poland into the EU, over two million Polish citizens left Poland for other EU member 
states (GUS policzył, 2007), equivalent to about a million more than there are 
members of the minorities in Poland, according to the 2011 census. By marrying EU 
citizens from other countries and moving back and forth between Poland, the states of 
their settlement in the EU, and the countries of origin of their spouses, the dynamic 
diaspora are gradually making Poland more ethnolinguistically heterogeneous than all 
the country‟s minorities could on their own. On top of that, being a relatively 
successful EU member state, Poland is gradually turning into an immigrant country, 
which is bound to make it even less homogenous. It is a credible possibility that 
unless the economic or political situation changes dramatically for worse, in 15-20 
years a tenth of Poland‟s population will be composed from minorities and 
immigrants, as in the case of neighbouring Germany. 
 
5.3 Waiting for Warsaw’s move 
Bearing the realities in mind, in May 2012 Silesian organizations appealed to Prime 
Minister Tusk for commencing of dialogue on the legal regulation of the status of the 
Silesians and their language in Poland, as recommended by the Council of Europe and 
the European Court of Human Rights (Wspólny, 2012). As always, contrary to the 
accusations of irredentism (or rather “anti-state-ism”) typically levelled against the 
Silesians in the press and on internet forums (c.f. Czego, 2012), as well as by some 
scholars (c.f. Nijakowski, 2005), the Silesian organizations emphasized that they had 
always operated and would continue operating within the confines of Polish and EU 
law (O nas, 2012). 
Two months later, in July 2012, representatives of the Silesian organizations 
handed the parliament another bill with an eye to the recognition of Silesian as a 
regional language (Gibas, 2012). Prior to that, in April 2012, without any 
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announcement, the term “Silesian language” was mentioned for the first time ever in 
official legislation not connected to censuses, through the ministerial act on the state‟s 
official register of geographical and place names. This register is to include alternative 
forms of the names in minority and regional languages recognized in Poland. In 
addition, the administration accepted the ISO 693-3 code szl for Silesian as binding in 
the document (Rozporządzenia, 2012: 6, 52). 
Perhaps this is the sign that at present the state administration is mulling over 
the question of what to do about the Silesians and their language. Such suspicion is 
supported by the fact that Poland is late with its third state report on the 
implementation and observance of the FCNM in the country, which was due in April 
2012 (Poland, 2012).  
 
Conclusion: A way forward? 
Officially, in Poland as in the EU as a whole, multiculturalism and multilingualism 
are hailed as values to be cherished and cultivated. The FCNM and the ECRML were 
intended as instruments to facilitate this process, but more than just a pinch of 
hypocrisy may be detected in all the steps. For instance, the ECRML began its life as 
the European Charter for Minority Languages, and the concept of “regional language” 
was introduced into it at France‟s insistence, which nevertheless did not lead to 
Paris‟s ratification of the charter, despite its signature in 1999. Adhering to the 
equation of citizenship with nationality, Paris maintains that in France there are no 
national minorities. By the same token, there are no minority languages in France; 
linguistic difference can be recognized only in non-nationally defined regional terms, 
if at all. 
In this fixation on national unity (or ethnolinguistic homogeneity), Poland is 
no different to France. The vagaries of history and international politics made Poland 
recognize some national and ethnic minorities, alongside their languages. Warsaw‟s 
reluctance to do this of its own accord has been palpable. The first tentative step to 
moderate this historical reluctance was already taken in 2005 in the case of the 
Kashubian language. Maybe it will be repeated in the case of the Silesian language if 
the rather unjustified fear that recognizing a language spoken by just 509,000 citizens 
could break up the country can finally be overcome. The Silesians, although they are 
statistically the largest national minority in Poland, are a tiny group vis-à-vis the 
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country‟s population of 38 million. Why disregard the Silesians‟ wish to enjoy their 
culture and language freely? The results of the two aforementioned censuses, the 
proliferating and developing organizations of the Silesians, and the lively burgeoning 
internet discourse on Silesian matters (also in Silesian) prove that the Silesians are not 
a mere invention of a handful of “ethnic entrepreneurs” (c.f. Kodyfikacja, 2012; 
Naród, 2012; Poseł, 2012). Importantly, the Silesians do not seem to harbour any evil 
or anti-state intentions, and they strive to adhere to the law and to the usual principles 
of democracy (c.f. O nas, 2012). Maybe Warsaw could reciprocate? And in such an 
eventuality, the Silesian language and culture would add a bit of spice to the 
saddening monotony of Poland‟s through and through ethnolinguistic homogeneity. 
 The surest path to a compromise would be dialogue and cooperation between 
the state administration and Silesian organizations, as repeatedly recommended by the 
Council of Europe. In order to create a neutral and objective framework for such a 
dialogue, it would be advisable if the Council of Europe could send a fact-finding 
mission to study the situation of the Silesians and their language in their home region 
of Upper Silesia, especially in relation to the provisions of the FCNM and the 
ECRML. A report on Poland‟s observance (or non-observance) of the provisions vis-
à-vis the Silesians could become a cornerstone of further discussion on the 
recognition of the Silesian language and of the Silesians as a minority. 
The institutional dialogue should involve representatives of Silesian 
organizations and the state administration as sources of information. The former 
should be treated in a preferential manner, due to the unrecognized or challenged 
status of Silesian organizations. This means that Silesian representatives should be 
furnished with the necessary paperwork and its translations, and their expenses should 
be reimbursed promptly either by the Council of Europe or the Polish administration.  
The proposed institutional dialogue, if undertaken, would in reality be 
conducted by nation-states and their representatives, as only states are members of the 
Council of Europe. In order to add a further, grassroots dimension to the dialogue, it is 
necessary to have a parallel study on the Silesians and the Silesian language prepared 
by an independent international non-government organization, for instance, the 
European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI) in Flensburg, Germany and/or Minority 
Rights Group International (MRG) in London, UK. 
A level playing field would thus be prepared for a dialogue between Silesian 
organizations and the state; subsequently, it would facilitate negotiating a legal status 
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for the Silesians and the Silesian language that would be satisfactory both to Silesian 
organizations and the state administration. The discussion and negotiations should be 
monitored by representatives of the Council of Europe, ECMI, and MRG, who could 
act as facilitators or moderators in moments of difficulty. It is a considerable effort, 
but worth attempting if it could ensure improved participation of the Silesians in the 
political and social life of Poland and the EU. With a population of 817,000, the 
Silesians are roughly twice as numerous as the Luxembourgers, and they almost 
exactly equal to the population of the southern half of Cyprus that is de facto 




1.  I thank Michael O. Gorman for his corrections and invaluable advice the two anonymous 
reviewers and Federica Prina for their useful suggestions for improvement, and Kelley 
Thompson for her meticulous editing.  The article began as a paper delivered at the 
conference „From Norm Adoption to Norm Implementation: Minority and Human Rights 
Revisited‟, held at the European Centre for Minority Issues in Flensburg, Germany on 
March 12, 2011. 
2.  The first-ever questionnaire-based research on the Silesians and their attitudes and 
opinions was conducted by Dolińska (2009), but the sample of 130 persons does not seem 
fully representative. The support of the state institutions for comprehensive sociological 
research on Poland‟s minorities is next to nil. The first-ever study of this kind focussed on  
Poland‟s German minority (concentrated in Upper Silesia) and was carried out in 2009-
2010 by scholars from the University of Osaka in Japan (28 kwietnia 2012; Perspektywy, 
2012). 
3.  I prefer to use the neologism “to ennationalize” over “to nationalize” to mean: making an 
ethnically or otherwise different group of people part of a target nation by making 
members of the aforesaid group adopt the nation’s salient ethnic and other identity 
markers. The coinage “to ennationalize” allows for the rescuing of this meaning from 
obscurity, as the term “to nationalize” is usually used to denote the state‟s seizure of 
private assets and private means of production. 
4.  Before 1922, only the German versions of place-names were employed in Upper Silesia, 
which was at that time part of Germany. Between 1922 and 1939, the Polish counterparts 
of the place-names made an appearance in Poland‟s share of Upper Silesia, but were 
replaced by German place-names during World War II. After 1945, all the place-names in 
Upper Silesia (and also elsewhere in the German territories incorporated into post-war 
Poland) were Polonized. In line with minority rights provisions, beginning in the late 
2000s, some bilingual place-names were allowed in Upper Silesia, pairing Polish and 
German versions of these names (Dwujęzyczne, 2012). 
5.  The Polish counterpart of the German term Zwischensicht is indyferentny narodowo 
(“nationally indifferent”) or z niewykrystalizowaną tożsamością narodową (“with her or 
his national identity not yet crystallized”). 
6.  The German term Oberschlesier literally means “Upper Silesian” and may denote any 
inhabitant of the region of Upper Silesia, irrespective of her or his language, religion or 
national identification. Slonzak is a German phonetic rendering of the Silesian-language 
self-ethnonym of Silesian, or Ślōnzok, as it is spelt in standard Silesian orthography. 
7.  Ironically, this measure did not prevent the feared demographic collapse for long, which 
became obvious in the Opole region five years after Poland‟s accession to the EU  
(Kuglarz, 2009). 




8.  Interestingly, in its 2004 judgement in the case of Gorzelik and others s Poland, the 
Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights assumed that Poland recognized 
or behaved as if recognizing the Silesians as an ethnic minority: „in all their decisions, the 
[Polish] authorities consistently recognized the existence of a Silesian ethnic minority and 
their right to associate with one another to pursue common objectives. All the various 
cultural and other activities that the association and its members wished to undertake 
could have been carried out had the association been willing to abandon its insistence on 
retaining the name [of a national minority] set out in paragraph 30 of its memorandum of 
association‟ (Grand Chamber, 2004). As explained in the article, today (2011-2012) the 
Silesians continue to have problems with Warsaw, which persists in refusing to recognize 
their language of Silesian, let alone them as an ethnic minority. 
9.  Obviously, Armenians and Tatars who arrived as immigrants to Poland from post-Soviet 
states after 1991 do speak their ethnic languages. However, from the legal perspective, as 
the vast majority of them are not Polish citizens, they do not constitute recognized part of 
Poland‟s Armenian and Tatar minorities (c.f. Marciniak, 2012: 4). 
10. Among Silesian activists the opinion prevails that ŚRS encountered no problems in the 
registration process because it was established by the Polish security forces. The 
organization‟s function was to assess the popularity of a separatist programme among the 
Silesians. Next to nobody was interested in it, which confirms the Silesians‟ respect for 
the rule of law. They wish to win Warsaw‟s recognition for themselves as a minority and 
for Silesian as a language in Poland, with full respect for Polish law, including 
appropriate international treaties to which Poland is a part. 
11. In the 2011 census the possibility of declaring two nationalities was introduced for the 
first time. It may be seen as a concession to the reality of multidimensional (multi-
constituent, multiple) identities people have, or as another instrument of furthering 
“Polonization”, if the state administration decides to classify those who declared both 
Polish and minority nationalities as ethnic Poles. Among the 817,000 Silesians, 362,000 
declared the Silesian nationality as their only one, and 455,000 added another nationality 
to it, in the vast majority of cases, the Polish one. Out of the 455,000 Silesians with dual 
nationality, 399,000 declared the Polish nationality as the first one and the Silesian 
nationality as second, and 56,000 reversed this order of declarations giving the first place 
to the Silesian nationality (c.f. Raport, 2012: 106). 
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